Search results for "Joint decisions"

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Noncooperative dynamic games for inventory applications: A consensus approach

2008

We focus on a finite horizon noncooperative dynamic game where the stage cost of a single player associated to a decision is a monotonically nonincreasing function of the total number of players making the same decision. For the single-stage version of the game, we characterize Nash equilibria and derive a consensus protocol that makes the players converge to the unique Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium. Such an equilibrium guarantees the interests of the players and is also social optimal in the set of Nash equilibria. For the multi-stage version of the game, we present an algorithm that converges to Nash equilibria, unfortunately not necessarily Pareto optimal. The algorithm returns a seque…

TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUSDynamic gamesComputer Science::Computer Science and Game TheoryMathematical optimizationCorrelated equilibriumSequential gameConsensus ProtocolsComputer scienceA-priori; Consensus protocols; Dynamic games; Finite horizons; Inventory; Inventory systems; Joint decisions; Multi stages; Nash equilibrium; Pareto-optimal; Single stages; Unilateral improvementsSymmetric equilibriumOutcome (game theory)Joint decisionsNash equilibriumFinite horizonsMulti stagessymbols.namesakeBayesian gameSettore ING-INF/04 - AutomaticaPareto-optimalA-prioriCoordination gameFolk theoremPrice of stabilityRisk dominanceNon-credible threatConsensus Protocols Dynamic Programming Game Theory InventoryInventory systemsTraveler's dilemmaNormal-form gameStochastic gameInventoryComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTINGTheoryofComputation_GENERALMinimaxConsensus protocolsEquilibrium selectionNash equilibriumBest responseSingle stagesRepeated gamesymbolsEpsilon-equilibriumSettore MAT/09 - Ricerca OperativaSolution conceptDynamic Programming Game TheoryUnilateral improvementsMathematical economicsGame theoryConsensus Protocols; Dynamic Programming Game Theory; Inventory
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